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ABSTRACT
Erickson, Heitzman, and Zhang’s (2013) results indicate that firms engage in taxmotivated loss recognition to offset previously recorded income. Since tax and financial income
by design is linked (Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter 1997), net operating loss reporting can
impose significant costs on CEOs who have to recognize similar losses for financial reporting
purposes. As a result, firms must motivate the CEO to accelerate loss recognition if the firm
expects to benefit from the cash inflows generated by the tax refund. In the current study, I
examine whether CEO cash-based compensation increases to offset the potential negative costs
that can arise due to NOL reporting. Counter to ex-ante predictions, the results do not indicate
that CEO cash-based compensation increases surrounding NOL reporting. The lack of cashbased compensation increase is consistent with NOL reporting arising from poor financial
performance, rather than tax-motivated loss recognition.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Firms have incentives to minimize tax burdens (Hanlon and Heitzman 2011). While
extant research has examined a number of different tax planning opportunities firms use to
minimize overall tax burdens, tax motivated loss-shifting recently examined by Erickson,
Heitzman, and Zhang (2013) represents a unique setting where firm incentives likely conflict
with chief executive officer (CEO) incentives. Specifically, since tax and financial accounting
income are linked (Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter 1997), net operating loss (NOL) reporting for
tax purposes likely results in the recognition of a loss for financial reporting purposes. Thus,
while NOLs can result in positive cash inflows for firms, they impose significant risks, such as
reduced financial compensation and future employment opportunities, on CEOs. Compensation
committees can offset this potentially negative risk by altering the CEO’s compensation structure
to shield the CEO from negative consequences. In this study, I examine a corollary question that
arises from Erickson et al.’s (2013) results: Does earnings-based compensation changes before a
firm reports a NOL?
Extent research indicates that CEO compensation contracts encourage corporate tax
planning, and that CEOs demand risk premiums through cash compensation. Gaertner (2014)
and Newman (1989) set up the expectation that CEO compensation packages motivate CEOs to
engage in tax planning activities that benefit the firm. Gaertner (2014) finds that compensating
CEOs on after-tax performance leads to greater tax planning effectiveness. Newman’s (1989)
results show that CEOs at multinational firms and firms with greater capital intensity are
compensated on after-tax profits due to these firms having more opportunities available for
income tax planning. Furthermore, Newman (1989) shows that firms that encourage tax planning
are more likely to use bonus plans to reward CEOs. Both of these studies examine tax planning
1

in general. Transferring their analysis to the current setting being examined leads to the
following ex-ante expectation when CEO and firm incentives are misaligned: CEO cash-based
compensation should increase surrounding tax-motived loss shifting.
Section 172 of the U.S. tax code permits firms that report a net operating loss in the
current period to carry that loss back two-years and forward twenty-years. Using a current period
NOL to offset prior year’s income results in positive cash flow to the firm, as the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) issues a refund of previously paid taxes for any income that is offset by
the current period NOL. Understanding Section 172, and the motivation firms may have to use
the carryback to generate positive cash flow, Erickson et al. (2013) develop a method to estimate
the amount of NOL carryback capacity for firms with projected losses. Erickson et al. (2013)
then identify a set of firms that stand to lose some of this carryback capacity if they do not
recognize a tax loss in the current year. Firms in this set that recognize losses in the current year
are identified by Erickson et al. (2013) as engaging in tax motivated loss-shifting. To answer my
research question, I follow Erickson et al.’s (2013) method, and identify a set of firms who
engage in tax motivated loss shifting. From 1994 to 2012, there are 15,250 firm-year
observations in my study.
Within this set of firms, I examine whether CEO’s cash based compensation increases
surrounding financially reported losses. Since Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter (1997) indicate
that tax and financial reporting are linked, I expect that financially reported losses are also
reported for tax purposes. While firms stand to receive positive cash flows from NOL carrybacks,
CEO’s may suffer negative financial and reputational consequences by reporting losses. Extant
research clearly indicates that CEO compensation is positively associated with current period
earnings (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Sloan 1993; Gaver and Gaver 1998). Given the increasing
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use of stock based compensation, negative financial market impacts associated with reported
financial losses will compound negative financial impacts suffered through cash based
compensation (Leone et al. 2006). Furthermore, Ghosh and Wang’s (2014) results indicate that
CEO turnover risk increases with financial loss reporting. These detrimental impacts to the CEO
result in a misalignment between the CEO and firm incentives with respect to tax motivated loss
shifting. As stated earlier, based on Gaertner (2014) and Newman (1989), I expect that in order
for CEOs to engage in tax motivated loss shifting, the firm would seek to shield CEO
compensation.
I estimate the statistical association between NOL firms and the percentage change in the
cash-based CEO compensation, after controlling for a set of control variables (e.g., advertising,
leverage, R&D). The results indicate that tax-motivated loss shifting incentives does not play a
statistically significant role in determining changes in CEO cash compensation. I also examine
the difference in the percentage change of CEO cash compensation between loss firms with taxmotivated loss shifting incentives and firms with financial difficulty. My results also show no
significant differences in the percentage change of CEO cash compensation between these two
groups. While my results are inconsistent with my ex-ante predictions, they are consistent with
NOL reporting arising from poor financial performance, rather than tax-motivated loss
recognition.
My study complements and extends recent literature on tax planning and executive
incentive compensation (e.g., Newman 1989; Phillips 2003; Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker
2012; Rego and Wilson 2012; Gaertner 2014) and tax-motivated loss shifting (e.g., Maydew
1997; Albring, Dhaliwal, Khurana, and Pereira 2011; Erickson et al. 2013). The current study
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links both areas to look at whether accelerating loss recognition (which generates a tax refund of
prior payments) is associated with compensation shielding.
This paper makes two contributions to the extant literature. First, my paper supplements
the results of existing research on executive compensation. It focuses attention on explaining the
role of tax-motivated loss shifting based on the incentives in CEO compensation contracts. My
results are inconsistent with firms motivating CEOs to report losses, but are consistent with NOL
reporting being associated with poor financial performance. Second, prior literature shows that
CEO after-tax compensation incentives increase corporate tax avoidance (Newman 1989;
Gaerter 2014) when the expected tax savings exceed the incremental cash compensation paid for
CEOs. This stream of research investigates the relationship between CEO cash compensation
and after-tax earnings performance. My paper has implications for research examining a wide
variety of factors that influence firms’ tax avoidance, such as executive characteristics, board
structure, and tax department orientation (Dyreng et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2010; Robinson et al.
2010). My work extends this stream of research exploring the variation in firms’ tax avoidance
activities by considering an alternative avenue of tax avoidance - NOL reporting by firms with
unrefunded tax incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses net operating
loss, and chapter 3 discusses book-tax differences. Chapter 4 reviews the related literature, and
specific hypothesis is developed in chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents research design. Chapter 7
discusses the sample selection and presents descriptive statistics. Results from empirical testing
of the hypothesis are provided in Chapter 8, and chapter 9 concludes. Chapter 10 discusses future
research.

4

CHAPTER 2. NET OPERATING LOSS
2.1 Section 382
Favorable tax attributes such as net operating losses can be used to claim a refund against
future taxable income. Since 1954 Congress has been concerned about the perceived problem of
“net-operating-losses-trafficking” when new shareholders of a corporation benefit from loss
recognition through acquiring or merging with another corporation. Section 382 seeks to prevent
the problem by imposing a limitation on the use of net operating losses. As Abrams, Doernberg,
and Leatherman (1998) state,
After a substantial ownership change, the earnings which can be offset by a net operating
loss are limited, but the amount of the net operating loss that can be used by the acquiring
corporation is not directly limited.... Generally, the loss corporation’s share is limited to
earnings generated by the assets contributed by the loss corporation. (pp. 271-2)
The annual limitation for any post-change year is an amount equal to the value of the old loss
corporation times the long-term tax-exempt rate.
Section 382 is determined by a change of the ownership. An ownership change occurs
when the stock of a loss corporation, which is owned by one or more 5 percent shareholders,
increases by more than 50 percentage points as a result of an ownership change or an equity
structure shift (Abrams et al. 1998). For the purposes of determining whether an ownership
change has occurred for those non-5 percent shareholders, all non-5 percent shareholders are
aggregated as a single 5 percent shareholder of such corporation (Abrams et al. 1998).
An “equity structure shift” generally means any tax free reorganization except a divisive
D, an F, or a G reorganization. A more than 50 percent equity shift occurs when after the
reorganization the percentage of stock held by one or more of the new loss corporation’s 5
percent shareholders is at least 50 percentage points higher than the percentage of the old loss
corporation’s stock held by them (Abrams et al. 1998). For example, A Corp., a loss corporation
5

merges with B Corp., a profit corporation. Neither of the two has at least one 5 percent
shareholder. In the merger, the former A Corp. shareholders own 49 percent of the B Corp. stock.
The B Corp. shareholders own 51 percent of the new loss corporation, which means that a more
than 50 equity shift occurred after the merger (Abrams et al. 1998).

6

CHAPTER 3. BOOK-TAX DIFFERENCES
U.S. companies are required to compute income separately for financial accounting and
tax purposes. The two different rules result in two different income measures and, therefore,
cause differences between financial accounting income and taxable income, commonly referred
to as book-tax differences (BTDs).
There are three sources of BTDs. First, BTDs can arise due to normal temporary and
permanent differences in the treatment of revenue and expenses for book and tax purposes.
Examples of temporary and permanent differences are depreciation, allowance for doubtful
accounts, stock-based option expenses, investments in tax exempt or tax-favored assets,
investments in tax havens with lower foreign tax rates, and participation in tax shelters that give
rise to losses for tax purposes but not for book purposes (Chen et al. 2010).
Second, large BTDs can arise from earnings management. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) gives managers greater discretion in their choice of accounting
procedures than does the tax system. Thus, large BTDs may be informative about earnings
quality. If BTDs are generated through earnings management, the accruals are more likely to
reverse in the next period (thus exhibiting low earnings persistence).
Third, the growing divergence between BTDs also can result from tax planning
(avoidance) strategies to reduce taxes paid. Such behavior leads to large BTDs but does not
necessarily result in accruals that will reverse in the following year.
Since the early 1990s, U.S. corporations have reported increasing differences between the
income reported to shareholders and the income reported to tax authorities. Some observers
interpret that the growing divergence between book incomes and taxable incomes is attributable
to increased earnings management, while others suggest the growing gap indicates an increase in
7

aggressive tax reporting behavior. Large BTDs have been viewed as a useful signal of earnings
quality (Hanlon 2005; Kim et al. 2011).
3.1 Temporary vs. Permanent Book-Tax Differences
Temporary (or timing) differences between book income and taxable income arise when
business income or expenses are recognized in one period for taxes, but in a different period for
financial accounting (book) purposes. These differences might include revenue recognition,
depreciation methods, bad debt expense, or loss contingencies.
Permanent (or scope) differences arise because a particular transaction is recognized
under GAAP, but not under the tax code. Examples of permanent differences are municipal bond
income, fines, and meals and entertainment. These items affect book income, but never affect
taxable income. Permanent differences have an impact on a corporation’s effective tax rate and
thus on reported net income. Permanent differences are differences that never reverse.
3.2 Book-Tax Differences about Future Earnings
Existing literature indicates that large book-tax differences (BTDs) can provide
information about earnings quality (Lev and Nissim 2004; Hanlon 2005; Phillips et al. 2003).
Phillips et al. (2003) and Hanlon (2005) examine whether deferred tax expense can inform us
about pre-tax earnings management. They consist only of temporary differences because these
differences are often hypothesized to provide information about pre-tax earnings quality. On the
other hand, Lev and Nissim (2004) focus on total differences between after-tax financial income
and taxable income.
Since the tax code allows less discretion in accounting choices than GAAP, large positive
BTDs can be informative about earnings management (Phillips et al. 2003; Blaylock et al. 2012).
Phillips et al.’s (2003) study supports that deferred tax expense (i.e., temporary book-tax
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differences) is informative about pre-tax earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and
to avoid a loss. Other research indicates that tax information contained in the financial statements
provides information about earnings quality, especially earnings persistence (Lev and Nissim
2004; Hanlon 2005; Blaylock et al. 2012). Hanlon’s (2005) study shows that for firm-years with
large positive temporary BTDs, pre-tax income is less persistent for future earnings than firmyears with small BTDs. Lev and Nissim (2004) support this view, finding the ratio of tax-tobook income predicts earnings growth for up to five years ahead, but they focus on total
differences between after-tax book income and taxable income. Hanlon (2005) also finds that
investors reduce their expectations of the persistence of earnings and accruals in the presence of
large positive BTDs and are able to efficiently price earnings and accruals for these firms,
confirming that investors do care about earnings persistence. She concludes that large positive
BTDs are a “red flag”, indicating low-quality earnings. Frank et al. (2009), however, report that
investors do not fully incorporate the information in discretionary accruals into stock prices; that
is, the market overprices financial reporting aggressiveness. Their analysis also reveals that the
market overprices tax reporting aggressiveness, but only for firms with the most aggressiveness
financial reporting. Under Frank et al.’s (2009) study, investors are unable to efficiently price
earnings and accruals for these firms, which is inconsistent with Hanlon’s (2005) results.
According to above studies, large BTDs do signal earnings quality issues. Deferred tax
expense or the ratio of tax-to-book income may be an appropriate approach to informing
earnings persistence (Hanlon and Heitzman 2011). Another view suggests that large BTDs are an
indicator of tax avoidance activities because of the different purpose of making the aggressive
reporting.

9

3.3 Book-Tax Conformity
While book-tax differences may seem to over-shadow normal accounting, many
transactions are reflected in financial statement income and taxable income with the same
accounting methods. This book-tax conformity links financial statement income and taxable
income. Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter (1997) examine the extent of book-tax conformity
between pre-TRA 86 and post-TRA 86. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) forced a set of
U.S. firms (sales in excess of $5 million) to use the accrual method of accounting for tax
purposes, which increased their book-tax conformity. The results show that companies that used
the cash method for tax purposes before 1986 and switched to the accrual method after 1986
showed a reduction in accruals after 1986, suggesting that firms deferred more income for
financial statement purposes after the tax law change.
There is an ongoing debate about whether the U.S. should eliminate differences between
accounting earnings and taxable income in order to improve earnings quality. Indeed, book-tax
conformity is an important issue among tax researchers and policymakers because it involves
earnings persistence, earnings quality, and future cash flows concern. Atwood et al.’s (2010)
evidence, for example, suggests that increased book-tax conformity may reduce earnings quality
because earnings have lower persistence and a lower association with future cash flows when
book-tax conformity is higher.
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CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW
4.1 Tax Incentives in Executive Compensation and Corporate Tax Avoidance
A number of studies in accounting develop and test theories about how certain attributes
of taxes and earnings affect their relative use as performance measures on executive
compensation contracts. Newman (1989) is the first paper to test firm characteristics,
multinational status, and capital intensity, about why some firms use after-tax profits, and other
firms use before-tax profits to determine short-term bonuses for CEOs. He finds that CEOs at
multinational firms and firms with capital intensity are compensated on after-tax profits due to
more opportunities available for income tax planning. As a result, firms are more likely to use
after-tax bonus plans to reward CEOs when there is available tax credit to reduce the income tax
expense.
Recent academic literature explores the determinants of corporate tax avoidance.1 A
subset of the literature examines how top executive incentives align with the profile of corporate
tax avoidance (e.g., Phillips 2003; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Armstrong et al. 2012; Rego and
Wilson 2012). However, the results are mixed. In the first study to test the effect of
compensating CEOs to reduce their firms’ tax burden, Phillips (2003) provides no evidence that
using after-tax earnings performance in CEO bonus plans is associated with reduced effective tax
rates (ETRs). The result is supported by Armstrong et al. (2012), who find no evidence that the
level of CEO pay is associated with any measure of corporate tax avoidance. Unlike Phillips
(2003) and Armstrong et al. (2012), Rego and Wilson (2012) examine CEO equity compensation
and find that stock option portfolio convexity can motivate managers to undertake risky tax
projects and is positively associated with tax aggressiveness. Rego and Wilson’s (2012) finding

1

See Hanlon and Heitzman 2011 for a review.
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is consistent with Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew’s (2010) suggestion that CEOs influence the
level of a firm’s tax avoidance activity. Rego and Wilson (2012) use equity compensation (i.e.,
stock options) as a motivator for tax planning and emphasize a positive association between
equity risk incentives and tax risk, which is expected to generate net benefits (i.e., profits;
positive net present value) for the firms and shareholders. However, the current study focuses on
firms reporting loss to claim a tax refund, which may result in a stock price drop affecting CEO
wealth. As a result, CEOs demand a risk premium through cash compensation, instead of equity
compensation, to compensate the potential loss. By extending Newman (1989) and re-examining
Phillips (2003), Gaertner (2014) finds a negative relation between CEO after-tax compensation
incentives and ETRs, and a positive relation between the after-tax incentives and CEO cash
compensation. Gaertner’s (2014) findings suggest that compensating CEOs on after-tax
performance leads to greater tax planning effectiveness, consistent with CEO compensation
contracts having a significant impact on corporate tax avoidance, and those CEOs demand a risk
premium through cash compensation.
4.2 Corporate Tax Avoidance
Corporate tax avoidance receives considerable attention from tax authorities and
researchers. Various studies analyze the link between different issues such as corporate tax
avoidance and time period (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008), corporate tax avoidance and
the growth of high-powered incentives (Desai and Dharmapala 2006), tax aggressiveness and
agency issues (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010), corporate tax avoidance on stock price
reaction (Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011), and the relationship between book aggressiveness and tax
aggressiveness (Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009; Wilson 2009).
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Dyreng et al. (2008) study firms’ ability to avoid income taxes over long periods of time,
and they find that approximately one-fourth of their sample firms appear to successfully maintain
long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent over sustained periods of time. Indeed,
decreasing taxes payable has become an important aspect of corporate tax planning. Dyreng et al.
(2008) also develop a long-run cash ETR measure, which reduces year-to-year volatility in
annual effective tax rates. The long-run computation is also used to estimate tax aggressiveness
by Frank et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2010), In addition, the use of cash taxes paid is beneficial
because it avoids tax accrual effects present in the current tax expense. Therefore, this study
improves upon the measurement of tax avoidance, specifically in the long run.
Another stream of recent tax avoidance research also suggests that large positive book tax
differences (hereafter, BTDs) signal both book and tax aggressiveness (Frank et al. 2009; Wilson
2009). Wilson‘s (2009) study documents that tax sheltering is positively associated with
aggressive financial reporting, echoing Frank et al.’s (2009) result that a strong, positive relation
between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness exists because nonconformity between
GAAP and tax code allows firms to engage in book income upward and taxable income
downward in the same reporting period. To examine the relation between financial and tax
aggressive reporting behaviors, Frank et al. (2009) develop a measure of tax reporting
aggressiveness. They find a positive relation between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax
reporting aggressiveness and the market prices earnings and accruals inefficiently for these firms.
The results in this study benefit investors concerning the consequences of aggressive corporate
reporting and benefit academics investigating aggressive tax and financial reporting behaviors.
Moreover, firms may face additional regulatory scrutiny from the IRS and external auditors if
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large book-tax differences are created aggressively for both financial and tax reporting purposes
(e.g., reporting a tax loss but a financial profit in the same year).
Chen et al. (2010) examine the relationship between tax aggressiveness and the non-tax
cost of a potential price discount in family firms and non-family firms. They find that family
firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts. The results interpret that family
owners are willing to forgo tax aggressive activities to avoid price discounts that arise from
minority shareholders’ concern over tax avoidance masking family rent-seeking activities. These
results substantiate the concern that family firms have relatively weak corporate governance
exposed by Wilson (2009) and Frank et al. (2009).
Chen et al.’s (2010) findings also support Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) results. Desai
and Dharmapala’s (2006) document that increases in incentive compensation reduce the level of
tax sheltering, corresponding with an enhancing relationship between managerial rent diversion
and corporate sheltering.2 This negative effect is especially driven by firms with relatively weak
corporate governance. The finding is consistent with the agency perspective on tax avoidance;
that is, tax avoidance activities facilitate managerial opportunistic behavior (Chen et al. 2010;
Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Kim et al. 2011). As a result, even though tax sheltering activities
may create little or no risk of penalties, it could still be better to leave the opportunities to avoid
the non-tax cost, such as a potential price discount (Desai and Dharmapala 2006). This claim
might help reconcile the result in Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) study with recent accounting
research (Hanlon 2005 and Lev and Nissim 2004) on the effects of BTDs on earnings persistence

2

Dynergy engaged in a transaction that provided for $300 million in operating cash flow on Dynegy’s financial
statements and a 12% rise in net income from transfer pricing activities (tax benefits) in 2001. However, the large
cash inflows were from a loan or a financing cash flow instead of operating cash inflows (Desai and Dharmapala
2006).
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and earnings quality (e.g., large BTDs are associated with a reduced degree of earnings
persistence and lower future returns).
Kim et al. (2011) explores the association between the extent of a firm’s tax avoidance
and its future stock price crash risk. Because tax avoidance activities may provide tools and
masks for managers to artificially enhance earnings and hide negative operating outcomes for
extended periods, those activities facilitate managerial rent extraction (Desai and Dharmapala’s
2006) and bad news hoarding activities (Kim et al. 2011). Kim et al.’s (2011) results show that
corporate tax avoidance activities increase firm-specific stock price crash risk. They also find
that the positive relation between tax avoidance and crash risk is weakened when high
institutional ownership serves as strong external monitoring mechanisms.3 Kim et al.’s (2011)
findings reinforce the agency perspective of corporate tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala,
2006), and they identify the significant costs that tax avoidance can impose on firms and their
shareholders, demonstrating the concern of agency issue in Chen et al. (2010).
4.3 Net Operating Loss Carrybacks
Another stream of research that focuses on the short-term tax incentive effect to shift
income to accelerate loss recognition has also been seen as an approach of corporate tax
avoidance. An early study that was conducted by Maydew (1997) finds that firms with net
operating loss (NOL) carrybacks during the year immediately after the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA 86) was enacted, shifted gross margin and SG&A expenses between the fourth quarter of
the NOL year and the first quarter of the following year. The gross margin and SG&A expense
shifting increases the refund of prior years’ taxes. Albring, Dhaliwal, Khurana, and Pereira (2011)
3

Enron entered into a tax transaction called “Project Steele” to manage pre-tax accounting earnings. The transaction
created $133 million to inflate pre-tax accounting earnings to make stock price increases, and helped opportunistic
managers extract benefits (e.g., excess executive compensation) from the inflated stock price.
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study the effect of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (hereafter, TRA 1997) on firm behavior.
TRA 1997 reduces the NOL carryback period from three to two years. An opportunity cost
would be incurred, because if a firm does not report an NOL in 1997, then it forgoes the refund
of taxes paid in 1994 and 1995. The study documents that the tax code change created a shortterm incentive to trigger income shifting to accelerate loss recognition in the tax year 1997.
Using data from 1981 to 2010, Erickson et al. (2013) investigate firms with NOL carryback
incentives and examine whether they incur losses to claim back taxes paid in prior periods. They
find that the possibility of net loss reporting to claim a cash refund of taxes increases when firms
paid taxes in the earliest carryback year, corresponding with a concern of tax-induced financial
reporting decisions.
Following my prior discussion, despite reporting a greater loss for financial reporting
purposes; managers’ compensation contracts motivate actions that maximize identified
performance measures. As a result, management incentives drive corporate outcomes. Because
managers are risk averse, firms need to provide greater incentives to encourage CEOs to engage
in income decreasing earnings management to accelerate loss recognition. CEOs who demand a
premium for bearing additional risk may receive greater cash compensation.
4.4 Compensation Contracts and Financial Reporting
A number of papers find that managers and directors face relatively severe penalties for
earnings manipulation (Dechow et al. 1996; Farber 2005). However, another stream of recent
research has begun to examine the manipulation of earnings numbers in order to influence
executive compensation contracts. Results in Matsunaga and Park (2001) and Mergenthaler et al.
(2009) suggest that boards might encourage and reward earnings management. Matsunaga and
Park (2001) find that CEOs’ bonuses are reduced when they miss the quarterly benchmark two,
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three, or four times during the year. The finding in Mergenthaler et al. (2009) shows that the
CEO bonus results of Matsunaga and Park (2001) also extend to equity-based compensation and
forced turnover.
Wallace (1997) compares a sample of firms where incentive compensation is based on
residual income-based measures4, to firms where incentive compensation is based on traditional
accounting earnings, in order to investigate whether management incentives drive corporate
performance. The findings show that firms adopting residual income compensation as opposed to
control firms engage in more activities associated with the explicit capital charge in residual
income-based measures. These findings are consistent with managerial incentives driving
corporate performance.

4

It is defined as earnings before interest less a capital charge on total capital (debt and equity).
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CHAPTER 5. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Managers are risk averse; however, principals are risk neutral (Scott 2009). Performance
measures selected for management compensation contracts are those measures that best motivate
management to maximize the value of the firm. Any incentive contract has both benefits and
costs. A firm can reward a manager to generate NOLs that refund prior year’s tax payments. The
additional benefits associated with recognizing NOLs are likely to exceed the additional costs
associated with greater compensation risk imposed on the manager via income decreasing
earnings management. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose
costs on both firms and managers. Therefore, managers must be motivated to engage in risky tax
activities that are expected to generate net benefits for the firm.
Compensation committees identify performance measures that can be observed and used
to design an efficient incentive contract, ex ante. The incentive contract will induce managers to
take the desired action. Then the committee uses those measures to evaluate manager
performance, ex post. Because the incentive plan allows for flexibility in compensation to reflect
some activity changes over the course of a year, the mix of earnings-based compensation that
motivates short-term decision making, and stock-based compensation that motivates long-term
decision making, are likely to differ from year to year. In order to align the financial interests of
shareholders and management, corporations expect operating income and total direct
compensation to trend together. However, in any given year, there might be some variability due
to goal changes. The two components of CEO compensation are cash (salary, bonuses, and nonequity incentives) and equity (stock options and restricted stock awards). Cash-based incentives
are like annual short-term incentive awards; while equity-based incentives are awarded under a
long-term performance component of the compensation plan. Because the value of stock options
18

and restricted stock depends on a company’s share price, this characteristic provides an incentive
to increase share price for the long run. If a corporation’s compensation committee encourages
the CEO to use income-decreasing earnings management in a given year, so as to accelerate loss
recognition and claim a refund of the prior years’ taxes, the committee will increase the cashbased compensation so as to achieve the short-term goal. Moreover, cash compensation
payments lead to an immediate deduction that reduces tax liabilities, while employee stock
options (restricted stock units) lead to a corporate deduction only when the options (units) are
eventually exercised (vested), which defer the tax deduction. Consequently, increasing cashbased compensation also can help to immediately reduce the corporation’s tax rate and tax
liability. However, when corporations encounter financial constraints, shortage of money may
trigger CEOs, either strategically or legitimately, to engage in tax-motivated loss recognition
without incentives encouraged by compensation committees. Finally, if the firm simply has poor
financial performance for a given year, there is no ex-ante expectation that the CEO’s
compensation should be adjusted. Therefore, the CEO’s cash-based compensation will not likely
change. In my empirical analysis, I will compare loss firms with tax incentive to loss firms with
financial constraints. This analysis leads to the following prediction:

H1: CEO compensation of loss firms with tax-motivated income shifting exhibits relatively
higher earnings-based compensation than that of loss firms with financial difficulty.
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CHAPTER 6. RESEARCH DESIGN
6.1 Net Operating Loss (NOL)
I follow Erickson et al.’s (2013) study by calculating the tax loss carryback capacity,
which is an estimate of the unrefunded tax payments in the earliest year of the carryback period
that will expire if the firm does not claim a refund in year t. The variable (NOLC) for the period
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if in year t the firm has unrefunded income tax paid in the
earliest carryback year, as defined in Appendix B. I next identify a set of firms that report a loss
(negative earnings) in year t, positive earnings the next year (t+1), and positive earnings in the
two prior years (t-1 and t-2). The variable (STR) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if in year t the
firm has negative earnings, and the firm reports positive earnings in years t-2, t-1, and t+1. This
approach identifies a set of firms that claim a refund of taxes paid in a prior year, that has a
corresponding amount of potentially refundable taxes, and that reports a profit in the year
following the claim.
Companies report a loss due to one of the following two scenarios. In the first scenario,
the compensation committee encourages the CEO to claim a tax refund of prior year’s taxes, by
reporting a loss in year t and carrying it back to years t-1 and t-2, with no loss to carry forward
into the future. Under this scenario, the loss reported in year t is sufficiently less than the positive
earnings of years t-1 and t-2, because the CEO is probably not willing to deeply jeopardize their
career. In the second scenario, if the company encounters financial distress and cannot meet its
minimum earnings target, the CEO may take a big bath to artificially enhance next year’s (and
potentially later years) earnings. Under this scenario, the loss reported in year t will substantially
be greater than the combined positive earnings in year t-1 and t-2, and there will be a substantial
loss carryforward. I classify these two scenarios as 1) the compensation contract incentive, and 2)
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the big bath incentive, respectively. As I will explain, the two scenarios are distinguished by
cutoffs based on the median for each scenario of the relative magnitude of the profits in the two
carry back years to the current year’s loss.
To compute the cut-off, I first separate firms into two groups. First, firms with losses in
year t that are less than the sum of the two prior year’s profits (t-2 and t-1). This group identifies
firms where the loss is under the prior two years profits (or just slightly over), so that the CEO
does not jeopardize their career. Second, firms with losses that are greater than the sum of the
two prior year’s total profits. This group identifies firms that encountered a financial crisis,
cannot meet their minimum earnings target, and the CEO uses big bath earnings management in
the current year. I next compute, for each group, the median absolute value of the ratio of the
sum of the profits in years t-2 and t-1 to the loss in year t. The medians of the two groups are
0.73 and 1.41, respectively for 1) the compensation contract incentive group, and 2) the big bath
incentive group. For simplicity, I use 0.75 and 1.50 as the respective cutoffs to distinguish the
two scenarios.
Erickson et al. (2013) mention firms are motivated to take advantage of tax loss
carryback provisions to claim a tax refund by accelerating loss recognition. I next use equation (1)
to distinguish firms with compensation contract incentives from firms with big bath incentives,
and equation (2) to distinguish firms with big bath incentives from loss firms that exceed the 1.5
cut-off:
(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−2 + 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−1 )*0.75 >= - 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡

(1)

(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−2 + 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−1 )*1.50 >= - 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡
> (𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−2 + 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−1 )*0.75

(2)
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Tax loss carryback laws create opportunities for firms to shift income to their advantage
by creating a loss to carryback to prior years and to claim a refund of prior year’s taxes paid.
Based on the classification of the two scenarios, the compensation contract incentive and the big
bath incentive, TAX INCENTIVE is a dummy variable that indicates that a firm has a
compensation contract incentive (equation 1), has the capacity for tax loss carrybacks (NOLC =
1), and reports negative earnings in year t (STR = 1). BIG BATH is a dummy variable that
indicates a firm has a big bath incentive (equation 2), has the capacity for tax loss carrybacks
(NOLC = 1), and reports negative earnings in year t (STR = 1). PROFIT is a dummy variable
indicating a firm that has the capacity for tax loss carrybacks (NOLC = 1) but reports positive
earnings in year t, and thus reports profits for the three years (t-2, t-1, and t).
6.2 Earning-Based Compensation
The current study examines the extent to which the change in earnings-based (hereafter,
cash-based) compensation precedes NOL reporting for the tax-motivated loss shifting purpose. I
use the percentage change in cash-based compensation of CEO pay to identify NOL reporting
primarily due to the compensation contract incentive (TAX INCENTIVE=1) or due to the big bath
incentive (BIG BATH=1).
I use four different methods to calculate CEO cash-based compensation changes.
Variable names from Execucomp are shown in bold and in parentheses. The first three methods
calculate the difference in the percentage of cash-based compensation between year t and t-1.
For firm i in year t and the CEO, I calculate cash-based compensation change, as follows:

𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡
−1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
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(3)

𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑞_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
−1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑞_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1

(4)

The first method, CASH_CHANGE, uses the Salary (SALARY) and Bonus (BONUS) to
calculate the percentage difference in the cash-based compensation between years t and t-1. The
second method, CASH_CHANGE_ INC, follows Gaertner (2014), by including all cash-based
compensation: Salary, Bonus and NonEq_Incent (NONEQ_INCENT) – non-equity incentives,
in order to calculate the percentage difference in the cash-based compensation between years t
and t-1.
The third method, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, which follows Seidman and Stomberg
(2012), is similar to CASH_CHANGE. However, NonEq_Incent is used if Bonus is missing.
The fourth method, CASH_WEIGHT, is calculated as the percentage difference between
total compensation derived from salary and bonus in years t and t-1, weighted for stock options
and restricted stock units. For firm i in year t and the CEO, I calculate CASH_WEIGHT, as
follows:

𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡
=

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡

−

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡−1

Options is the fair value of stock options granted (OPTION_AWARDS_FV). RSU
(STOCK_AWARDS_FV) is defined as the fair value of restricted stock units granted to
executive during the year.
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(5)

To test the change in the earning-based CEO compensation when firms report NOLs with
tax-motivated loss-shifting incentives, I estimate equation (6):

𝐶_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝐼𝐺 𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐻 𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡

(6)

where C_CHANGE is one of four dependent variables: CASH_CHANGE, CASH_CHANGE_INC,
CASH_CHANGE_SBORINC, or CASH_WEIGHT. Each dependent variable is estimated in
separate OLS regressions. My main interests are TAX INCENTIVE and BIG BATH, the
difference between TAX INCENTIVE and BIG BATH, and the difference between TAX
INCENTIVE and PROFIT. In hypothesis 1, I predict that NOL reporting should lead to a
relatively higher CEO cash-based compensation of loss firms with tax incentives (i.e., TAX
INCENTIVE) than that of loss firms with financial difficulty (i.e., BIG BATH). As such, 𝛽1
should be positive and greater than 𝛽2. I have no prediction for the sign of 𝛽2. The coefficient on
TAX INCENTIVE in this model is interpreted as the percentage change of CEO cash-based
compensation that increases with NOL carryback incentives due to compensation contracts.
Therefore, the main test variable (TAX INCENTIVE) for the period is a dummy variable
that indicates a firm with tax incentives has refunded income tax paid in the earliest carryback
year (t-2) and reports a loss (negative earnings) in the current year.
6.3 Control Variables
I control for several variables which have been used in the literature and represents a
vector of time-varying, firm-level controls, including research and development (R&D), leverage
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(LEVERAGE), intangible assets (INTANGIBLE), an indicator for whether the firm has foreign
operations (FOREIGN_OPE), CEO tenure (TENURE), and advertising expense
(ADVERTISING). Variable definitions are in Appendix A.
The variable SIZE controls for possible economies of scale related to tax planning as well
as for variation in the political costs of tax planning (Gupta and Newberry 1997). Research and
development (R&D) is included because additional research and development tax credits reduce
the effective tax rate of the firm (Berger 1993). Leverage (LEVERAGE) controls for differences
in tax planning opportunities related to capital structure decisions (Gupta and Newberry 1997).
The ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INTANGIBLE) controls for possible income shifting
from high- to low-tax jurisdictions (Desai and Hines 2002). Foreign operations, an indicator for
whether the firm has foreign operations (FOREIGN_OPE), controls for additional tax credits
from tax planning opportunities (Dyreng et al. 2010). CEO tenure (TENURE) controls for CEO
entrenchment which may lead to higher cash compensation. Advertising expenses
(ADVERTISING) control for financial constraints, which increase the need for a tax refund from
prior years.
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CHAPTER 7. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
7.1 Data
I begin with a sample of firm-years from 1994-2012 in the intersection of Compustat,
ExecuComp, and CRSP databases that are incorporated in the U.S., are industries other than
financial services and utilities, and have nonmissing asset data. I use 1994 as a starting point
because the accounting for income taxes has changed significantly since 1993 with the
implementation of SFAS No. 109. To be included in the final sample, the observations do not
include missing variables used in the regression and missing SIC. My final sample consists of
15,250 firm-years.
7.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the full sample (15,250 firm-years). Variable
definitions are in Appendix A. Average CEO cash compensation (CASH_COMP) is $1.672
million. Table 1 shows that roughly 2.9 percent of firms with refundable tax payments (TAX
INCENTIVE+ BIG BATH) have an incentive to report negative earnings, which is close to that in
Erickson et al. (2013). 75.4 percent of firms, on average, report a profit three years in a row
(PROFIT). The mean CASHCHANGE, excluding non-equity incentive, is 26.3 percent. The
mean for ADVERTISING is 1.1 percent, which is consistent with Dyreng et al. (2010). The
averages of FOREIGN_OPE and LEVERAGE are 57.2 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively;
while the standard deviations of FOREIGN_OPE and LEVERAGE are 49.5 percent and 15.5
percent, respectively; which are close to those in Dyreng et al. (2010). Mean intangible assets
represent 15.7 percent of total assets; while average CEO tenure is 8.59 years. The averages of
BOOK_TO_MARKET and SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN are 60.4 percent and 4.9 percent,
respectively. Overall, I conclude my variables are consistent with prior studies.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Univariate Statistics
Variable
CASHCHANGE
CASHCHANGE_INC
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC
CASH_WEIGHT
CASH_COMP ($MM)
TAX INCENTIVE
BIG BATH
PROFIT
TENURE
R&D
LEVERAGE
INTANGIBLE
FOREIGN_OPE
SIZE
ADVERTISING
BOOK_TO_MARKET
SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN

N
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250
15,250

Mean
0.263
0.325
0.322
0.029
1.672
0.024
0.005
0.754
8.592
0.034
0.171
0.157
0.572
7.336
0.011
0.604
0.049

Std. Dev.
2.951
3.002
2.993
1.896
2.101
0.152
0.072
0.431
7.735
0.064
0.155
0.173
0.495
1.532
0.026
0.256
0.523

Q1
-0.041
-0.077
-0.079
-0.144
0.683
0.000
0.000
1.000
3.132
0.000
0.020
0.007
0.000
6.217
0.000
0.414
-0.208

Median
0.054
0.084
0.082
-0.009
1.139
0.000
0.000
1.000
6.170
0.001
0.154
0.095
1.000
7.173
0.000
0.591
-0.007

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. All variables presented are defined in Appendix A.
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Q3
0.230
0.314
0.312
0.093
2.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
11.449
0.036
0.268
0.252
1.000
8.311
0.009
0.774
0.216

CHAPTER 8. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
8.1 Correlation Matrix
Table 2 presents the Spearman correlation matrix of the dependent and independent
variables used in this study. The correlations between the TAX INCENTIVE variable and the
dependent variables (CASHCHANGE, CASHCHANGE_INC, and CASHCHANGE_SBORINC)
are all negative and significant at conventional levels. The BIG BATH variable also is negatively
correlated with CASHCHANGE, CASHCHANGE_INC, and CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, but the
correlation is weaker than those with TAX INCENTIVE. PROFIT firms are positively correlated
with CASHCHANGE, CASHCHANGE_INC, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and CASH_WEIGHT.
I do not find a significant correlation between PROFIT firms and the dependent variables. While
these correlations are not in the predicted direction, multivariate analysis seems necessary to test
my hypothesis.
8.2 Multivariate Analysis
Table 3 presents results from estimating equation (6) by each of the four dependent
variables (CASHCHANGE, CASHCHANGE_INC, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and
CASH_WEIGHT). To support my hypothesis, I expect that the coefficient on TAX INCENTIVE is
positive and greater than the coefficient on BIG BATH. However, the evidence shows that CEO
cash-based compensation does not increase with NOL carryback incentives.
Examining the regression results when CASHCHANGE is the dependent variable, the
coefficient on TAX INCENTIVE is 0.301 (p=0.38), indicating that the percentage change of cashbased compensation increases by 30.1 percent in years when a loss firm has a tax-based incentive
to accelerate losses. However, the coefficient on TAX_INCENTIVE is not statistically significant.
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix
Panel A: Variable CASHCHANGE to CASH_COMP

CASHCHANGE
CASHCHANGE_INC
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC
CASH_WEIGHT
TAX INCENTIVE
BIG BATH
PROFIT
CASH_COMP
TENURE
R&D
LEVERAGE
INTANGIBLE
FOREIGN_OPE
SIZE
ADVERTISING
BOOK_TO_MARKET
SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN

CASHCHANGE
1
0.770
0.753
0.296
-0.050
-0.023
0.007
0.141
-0.133
0.003
0.002
-0.047
-0.010
-0.014
-0.048
-0.070
0.202

CASHCHANGE
_INC

CASHCHANGE
_SBORINC

CASH_WEIGHT

TAX INCENTIVE

BIG BATH

PROFIT

CASH_COMP

1
0.951
0.395
-0.064
-0.036
0.009
0.258
-0.133
0.004
0.000
-0.011
0.005
0.020
-0.024
-0.097
0.258

1
0.420
-0.061
-0.031
0.006
0.245
-0.134
0.003
0.003
-0.011
0.005
0.016
-0.022
-0.089
0.252

1
-0.015
-0.002
0.002
0.110
-0.030
-0.005
-0.001
0.009
0.006
0.008
-0.002
-0.004
0.083

1
-0.011
-0.273
-0.055
0.002
0.030
0.024
0.007
0.022
-0.005
-0.011
0.070
-0.012

1
-0.127
-0.030
0.001
-0.002
0.017
0.020
0.010
-0.010
-0.008
0.065
-0.042

1
0.069
0.029
-0.056
-0.078
0.045
-0.024
0.022
0.044
-0.175
0.043

Table 2 presents Spearman correlation coefficients. All variables presented are defined in Appendix A. Coefficient values in bold are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

29

1
-0.036
-0.033
0.189
0.241
0.226
0.691
0.118
-0.035
0.139

(Table 2 continued)

Panel B: Variable TENURE to SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN

TENURE
R&D
LEVERAGE
INTANGIBLE
FOREIGN_OPE
SIZE
ADVERTISING
BOOK_TO_MARKET
SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN

TENURE
1
-0.023
-0.069
-0.061
-0.054
-0.120
-0.012
-0.028
0.009

R&D

LEVERAGE

INTANGIBLE

FOREIGN_OPE

ASSETS

ADVERTISING

BOOK_TO
_MARKET

1
0.202
-0.016
0.355
-0.062
0.364
-0.057

1
0.183
0.205
0.046
0.068
-0.001

1
0.263
-0.019
-0.045
0.022

1
0.056
0.100
0.012

1
-0.116
0.009

1
-0.248

SIZE
ADJUSTED
RETURN

1

1
-0.243
0.077
0.375
-0.037
-0.045
-0.275
0.020

Table 2 presents Spearman correlation coefficients. All variables presented are defined in Appendix A. Coefficient values in bold are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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The difference in the percentage change of cash-based compensation between loss firms with
tax-motivated loss shifting incentive (TAX_INCENTIVE) and loss firms with financial difficulty
(BIG BATH) is 0.702 (p=0.57). But the difference is still not statistically significant. The result
is also not significant when CASH_COMP_INC, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and
CASH_WEIGHT are chosen as the dependent variable. As a result, hypothesis 1 is not supported
by any of the dependable variables.

Table 3
Analysis of Cash Compensation Changes and Loss Carrybacks (Full Sample)
(n = 15,250)

Variablea,b
Intercept
TAX INCENTIVE (β1)
BIG BATH (β2)
PROFIT (β3)
R&D
LEVERAGE
INTANGIBLE
FOREIGN_OPE
TENURE
ADVERTISING
SIZE
BOOK_TO_MARKET
SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN
Year Effect
R-squared
Diff. between β1 and β2
Diff. between β1 and β3

CASHCHANGE
Coefficient
0.098
0.301
1.003
-0.095 *
0.393
-0.211
-0.144
-0.014
-0.014 ***
0.034
0.032 *
0.022
0.176 ***

CASHCHANGE_
INC
Coefficient
0.101
0.222
0.928
-0.122 **
0.252
-0.218
-0.182
-0.017
-0.016 ***
0.387
0.040 **
-0.029
0.217 ***

Yes
0.008
No
No

Yes
0.007
No
No

CASHCHANGE_
SBORINC
Coefficient
0.114
0.220
0.943
-0.124 **
0.239
-0.211
-0.174
-0.016
-0.015 ***
0.393
0.038 **
-0.020
0.214 ***
Yes
0.007
No
No

CASH_
WEIGHT
Coefficient
-0.178 *
0.436
-0.050
0.001
0.377
-0.088
-0.101
-0.001
-0.003 ***
0.520
0.013
0.113 *
0.076 **
Yes
0.004
No
No

*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
a

All variables are defined in Appendix A.
The dependent variables are stated in the column heading.
b

All p-values are based on two-tailed tests and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm
and year (Peterson 2009; Gow et al. 2010).
An F-test is performed for differences between β1 and β2 and between β1 and β3.
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Further analysis shows that the difference between loss firms with tax-motivated loss
shifting incentive (TAX_INCENTIVE) and profit firms with loss carryback capacity (PROFIT) is
0.396 (p=0.24). I interpret the result that the change in cash compensation increases by 43
percent more for loss firms with tax-motivated loss shifting than for profit firms with only
carryback capacity but no incentive to carry back losses. However, the difference is not
statistically significant. The result also is not statistically significant when CASH_COMP_INC,
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and CASH_WEIGHT are chosen as the dependent variable.
Overall, the results in Table 3 do not provide support for the prediction that firms with
tax motivated loss shifting incentives increase cash compensation to CEOs for bearing additional
risk, compared to firms without tax motivated loss shifting. Instead, the results show that
accelerating loss recognition, when the firm expects to benefit from the cash inflows generated
by the tax refund, does not increase cash-based CEO compensation. Therefore, NOL reporting
seems more likely due to financial difficulty that the firm is encountering.
Table 4 also presents results from estimating equation (6) by each of the four dependent
variables (CASHCHANGE, CASHCHANGE_INC, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and
CASH_WEIGHT); but, I partition the sample into three time periods: 1994 – 2001; 2002 – 2005;
and 2006 – 2013. The first sample period ends in 2001 in order to exclude the effects of The
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). SOX was passed in 2002 in reaction to high profile
corporate and accounting scandals, including Enron, Worldcom, and Arthur Andersen. The
passage of SOX in 2002 has affected companies’ corporate governance, internal control,
boardroom diversity, corporate culture, tax shelters, and so on. Therefore, separating pre -and
post - years of the passage of SOX provides evidence for the effect of the change in corporate
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Table 4
Analysis of Cash Compensation Changes and Loss Carrybacks (Partitioned Sample)

Variablea,b
Year: 1994 - 2001 (n = 6,706)
TAX INCENTIVE (β1)
BIG BATH (β2)
PROFIT (β3)
Control Variables
Year Effect
R-squared
Diff. between β1 and β2
Diff. between β1 and β3
Year: 2002 - 2005 (n = 3,335)
TAX INCENTIVE (β1)
BIG BATH (β2)
PROFIT (β3)
Control Variables
Year Effect
R-squared
Diff. between β1 and β2
Diff. between β1 and β3
Year: 2006 - 2013 (n = 5,209)
TAX INCENTIVE (β1)
BIG BATH (β2)
PROFIT (β3)
Control Variables
Year Effect
R-squared
Diff. between β1 and β2
Diff. between β1 and β3

CASHCHANGE
Coefficient

CASHCHANGE_
INC
Coefficient

0.732
-0.183
-0.056

0.732
-0.183
-0.056

Yes
Yes
0.008
No
No

-0.242 ***
2.717
-0.128 *

***

1.714
-0.173
-0.018

Yes
Yes
0.011
No
No

-0.467 ***
2.520
-0.200 **
Yes
Yes
0.017
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
0.008
No
No

1.775
-0.084
-0.083

Yes
Yes
0.011
No
No

***

Yes
Yes
0.012
No
No

-0.473 ***
2.557
-0.205 ***
Yes
Yes
0.017
No
Yes

CASH_
WEIGHT
Coefficient
0.866
-0.039
0.014

Yes
Yes
0.008
No
No

1.775
-0.084
-0.083

Yes
Yes
0.011
No
No

Yes
Yes
0.019
No
Yes

0.732
-0.183
-0.056

Yes
Yes
0.008
No
No

1.775
-0.084
-0.083

CASHCHANGE_
SBORINC
Coefficient

***

-0.116 ***
-0.038
-0.002
Yes
Yes
0.008
No
Yes ***

*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
a

All variables are defined in Appendix A.
The dependent variables are stated in the column heading.
b

All p-values are based on two-tailed tests and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm
and year (Peterson 2009; Gow et al. 2010).
An F-test is performed for differences between β1 and β2 and between β1 and β3.
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governance on the change of a company’s tax policy and CEO compensation. Thus, the second
sample period is from 2002 to 2005 before the next major economic event in 2006.
The third sample starts in 2006 when the U.S. housing market collapsed and ends in 2013 shortly
after the global recession ended. The housing market collapse in 2006 was followed in 2007 with
the subprime mortgage market beginning to display an increasing rate of mortgage defaults. The
financial crisis played a significant role in the failure of businesses, decline in consumer wealth,
and the downturn in economic activity, which lead to the 2008–2012 global recession. Because
the crisis had an extensive effect on the U.S. and global economy, companies faced a range of
risks that needed to be managed, including operational, strategic, and market risks. A company’s
corporate governance procedures and policies, reporting strategies, and tax strategies were likely
influenced by the profound financial crisis. Moreover, the change of rules regarding disclosure of
executive compensation such as executive and director compensation, related person transactions,
director independence and other corporate governance matters, and security ownership of
officers and directors in 2006 may also affects corporate reporting behaviors (U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2006).
Table 4 presents results from estimating equation (6) for the three time periods and for
each of the four dependent variables (CASHCHANGE, CASHCHANGE_INC,
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and CASH_WEIGHT). Examining the regression results for 1994–
2001 when CASHCHANGE is the dependent variable, the coefficient on TAX_INCENTIVE is
0.732 (p=0.24), indicating that the percentage change of cash-based compensation increases by
73.2 percent in years when a loss firm has a tax-based incentive to accelerate losses. However,
the coefficient on TAX_INCENTIVE is not statistically significant. The difference in the
percentage of cash-based compensation between loss firms with tax-motivated loss shifting
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incentive (TAX_INCENTIVE) and loss firms with financial difficulty (BIG BATH) is 0.915
(p=0.14); however the difference is not statistically significant. The results are also not
significant when CASH_COMP_INC, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and CASH_WEIGHT are the
dependent variable; thus hypothesis 1 is not supported for the period 1994 to 2001.
As well, the difference between loss firms with tax-motivated loss shifting incentive
(TAX_INCENTIVE) and profit firms with loss carryback capacity (PROFIT) is 0.788 (p=0.20). I
interpret the result that the change in cash compensation increases by 78.8 percent more for loss
firms with tax-motivated loss shifting than for profit firms with only carryback capacity but no
incentive to carry back losses. Again the difference is still not statistically significant. The result
also is not statistically significant when CASH_COMP_INC, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and
CASH_WEIGHT are the dependent variable.
The results from 2002–2005 also provide no support. However, the period of 2006–2013
shows some differences when compared to those of the other two periods. When CASHCHANGE
is the dependent variable, the coefficient on TAX_INCENTIVE is -0.242 (p=0.01), and is
statistically significant, indicating that the percentage change of cash-based compensation
decreases by 24.2 percent in years when a loss firm has a tax-based incentive to accelerate losses.
This is again consistent with the NOL reporting being due to financial difficulty, rather than tax
motivations. The TAX_INCENTIVE coefficient is also significant when CASH_COMP_INC,
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and CASH_WEIGHT are the dependent variable. The difference in
the percentage of cash-based compensation between loss firms with tax-motivated loss shifting
incentive (TAX_INCENTIVE) and loss firms with financial difficulty (BIG BATH) is 2.959
(p=0.32); however, the difference is not statistically significant; thus, hypothesis 1 is not
supported.
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Interestingly, the difference in the percentage of cash-based compensation between loss
firms with tax-motivated loss shifting incentive (TAX_INCENTIVE) and profit firms with loss
carryback capacity (PROFIT) is 0.114 (p=0.00). I interpret the result that the change in cashbased compensation decreases by 11.4 percent more for loss firms with tax-motivated losing
shifting incentives than for profit firms also with loss carryback capacity; the difference between
the two coefficients is statistically significant. The results also hold when CASH_COMP_INC,
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC, and CASH_WEIGHT are the dependent variable.
Overall, the results in Table 4 do not provide support for the prediction that firms with
tax motivated loss shifting incentives increase cash compensation to CEOs for bearing additional
risk. Instead, the results show that accelerating loss recognition when the firm expects to benefit
from the cash inflows generated by the tax refund does not change cash-based CEO
compensation, or when it does change, decreases cash-based CEO compensation. Therefore,
NOL reporting is likely motivated by financial difficulty that the firm is encountering, rather
than by CEO compensation incentives.
8.3 Univariate Analysis
Panel A of Table 5 compares the mean values of the dependent variables and control
variables, for loss firms with tax-motivated loss shifting incentive (TAX_INCENTIVE) and loss
firms with financial difficulty (BIG BATH). These univariate results show that loss firms with
financial difficulty (BIG BATH) pay more cash-based compensation than those with taxmotivated loss shifting incentive (TAX_INCENTIVE). BIG BATH firms have a higher mean
value of CASHCHANGE, CASHCHANGE_INC, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC than
TAX_INCENTIVE firms. Thus, loss firms with financial difficulty have a higher percentage
change in cash-based compensation than those with tax-motivated loss shifting incentive.
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Table 5
Univariate Statistics
Panel A

Variable
CASHCHANGE
CASHCHANGE_INC
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC
CASH_WEIGHT
R&D
LEVERAGE
INTANGIBLE
FOREIGN_OPE
TENURE
ADVERTISING
SIZE
BOOK_TO_MARKET
SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN

Mean for TAX
INCENTIVE (β1)
(N = 362)
0.6245
0.6153
0.6142
0.4852
0.0640
0.1962
0.1598
0.6409
8.6131
0.0070
7.2532
0.7190
0.0200

Mean for
BIG BATH (β2)
(N = 80)
1.3303
1.2711
1.2988
-0.0414
0.0653
0.2054
0.1929
0.6375
8.1359
0.0077
7.1361
0.8482
-0.1619

t-test for
Differences in
Means
-0.7058
-0.6558
-0.6846
0.5266
-0.0013
-0.0092
-0.0331
0.0034
0.4772
-0.0007
0.1171
-0.1292
0.1819

***
***
***
***

*
***

***

Table 5 presents descriptive statistics by TAX INCENTIVE and BIG BATH subsamples. All variables
presented are defined in Appendix A.
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
Panel B

Variable
CASHCHANGE
CASHCHANGE_INC
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC
CASH_WEIGHT
R&D
LEVERAGE
INTANGIBLE
FOREIGN_OPE
TENURE
ADVERTISING
SIZE
BOOK_TO_MARKET
SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN

Mean for TAX
INCENTIVE (β1)
(N = 362)
0.6245
0.6153
0.6142
0.4852
0.0640
0.1962
0.1598
0.6409
8.6131
0.0070
7.2532
0.7190
0.0200

Mean for
PROFIT (β3)
(N = 11,495)
0.2217
0.2834
0.2792
-0.0028
0.0302
0.1640
0.1613
0.5648
8.7395
0.0117
7.3610
0.5770
0.0548

t-test for
Differences in
Means
0.4028
0.3319
0.3350
0.4880
0.0338
0.0322
-0.0015
0.0761
-0.1264
-0.0047
-0.1078
0.1420
-0.0348

Table 5 presents descriptive statistics by TAX INCENTIVE and PROFIT subsamples. All variables
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
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***
***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
*
**
***

However, BIG BATH firms also present a negative mean value of CASH_WEIGHT. This shows
that the weight in cash-based compensation to total compensation decreases in the loss year.
Moreover, TAX_INCENTIVE firms have higher CEO tenure and stock return and lower
advertising.
Panel B of Table 5 compares the mean values of the same variables for loss firms with
tax-motivated loss shifting incentive (TAX_INCENTIVE) and profit firms with loss carryback
capacity (PROFIT). Because unrefundable tax payments create short-term incentives to
accelerate loss recognition, firms may engage in income-decreasing earnings management in
order to generate losses for loss carryback purposes (Albring, Dhaliwal, Khurana, and Pereira
2011). Therefore, firms with loss carryback capacity that do not manage earnings down are more
likely to report profits (i.e., PROFIT firms). Panel B shows that TAX_INCENTIVE firms have a
higher mean value of CASHCHANGE, CASHCHANGE_INCENT, CASHCHANGE_SBORINC,
and CASH_WEIGHT than PROFIT firms. Thus, firms with loss-shifting incentives have a higher
percentage change in cash-based compensation than profit firms with loss-carryback capacity,
suggesting that income-decreasing earnings management was likely used by TAX_INCENTIVE
firms, and that TAX_INCENTIVE firms pay more cash-based compensation than PROFIT firms.
As well, note that TAX_INCENTIVE firms also have higher R&D, higher leverage, higher
foreign operations, higher book-to-market ratio, lower CEO tenure, lower advertising, lower firm
size, and lower stock return than profit firms with capacity, consistent with Panel A results.
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION
In the current study I investigate whether CEO compensation plans affect tax-motivated
loss shifting. Specifically, I study whether there is an increase in the percentage of cash-based
(i.e., earnings-based) CEO compensation before firms report a net operating loss (NOL)
consistent with tax motivated loss-shifting. I measure tax-motivated loss-shifting by identifying
firms that have loss carryback capacity and report a small loss in the current year. I identify two
scenarios where the CEO will incur a sufficiently large loss (based on relative size) to carry back
to the two prior years and claim a tax refund of prior year’s taxes. At the same time, the CEO
reports a profit in the year following the current year (t+1) so as to not jeopardize their
compensation contract and job security. The results do not show that CEO cash-based
compensation changes are higher for firms with tax motivated loss-shifting. The evidence
suggests that there is no increase in earnings-based compensation that plays a role of accelerating
loss recognition to obtain a tax refund that is beneficial to the firm’s operating cash flow and
which is encouraged by the compensation committee.
The evidence is relevant in understanding the growing importance of executive
compensation. Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits public corporations from
deducting more than $1 million per year in compensation paid to each of certain executives.
However, the Section 162(m) limit on deductible compensation does not apply to qualified
performance-based compensation, which means that the compensation is based on performance
goals, and most of the time the performance goal is linked to the financial statement income
performance. Therefore, the setup works against the CEO’s incentives to report a loss. Since
actual tax return data are confidential, I do not know whether loss firms, with tax-loss carryback
incentives, deduct taxes for cash compensation beyond the $1 million. However, prior research
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does find that NOL firms display higher (lower) levels of income-decreasing (-increasing)
earnings management (Albring et al. 2011). Their results imply that loss firms with tax-loss
carryback incentives may engage in income-decreasing earning management in order to generate
enough losses to carryback. The losses may be enough to cover non-deductable taxes beyond the
$1 million.
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CHAPTER 10. FUTURE RESEARCH
While the results show no relation between CEO cash-based compensation changes and
tax loss carryback incentives, they should be interpreted with care. The period 2006 – 2012
shows a negative association between the percentage change of cash-based compensation and
small loss reporting. The results in my research imply that reporting a tax loss may decrease firm
value which is contrary to Erickson et al.’s (2013) argument that carrying back tax losses is a tax
motivated strategy to utilize refundable tax capacity. However, if the corporate reporting
decision can increase firm value, we will not see a decrease in CEO cash-based compensation.
Future research may focus on the reason behind NOL reporting to understand the relationship
between corporate governance and tax reporting strategies.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable
Dependent variable:
CASHCHANGE
CASHCHANGE_INC
CASHCHANGE_SBORINC
CASH_WEIGHT

Variable(s) of interest:
NOLC
STR
TAX INCENTIVE
BIG BATH
PROFIT
Other variables:
CASH_COMP
CASH_COMP_INC
R&D
LEVERAGE
INTANGIBLE
FOREIGN_OPE
TENURE
SIZE
ADVERTISING
BOOK_TO_MARKET
SIZE ADJUSTED RETURN

Definition
Percentage change in CEO cash compensation, excluding non-equity incentive, measured as
((SALARY t +BONUS t )/(SALARY t-1 +BONUS t-1 ))-1.
Percentage change in CEO cash compensation, including non-equity incentive, measured as
((SALARY t +BONUS t +NONEQ_INCENT t )/(SALARY t-1 +BONUS t-1 +NONEQ_INCENT t-1 ))-1.
Percentage change in CEO cash compensation. If BONUS missing, then use (NONEQ_INCENT ).
Weight change in CEO cash compensation, measured as ((SALARY t +BONUS t )/
(SALARY t +BONUS t +STOCK_AWARDS t +OPTION_AWARDS t )) - ((SALARY t-1 +BONUS t-1 )/
(SALARY t-1 +BONUS t-1 +STOCK_AWARDS t-1 +OPTION_AWARDS t-1 )).
1 if a firm has an estimate of potentially unrefunded tax payments on income in the earliest carryback
year, and 0 otherwise.
1 if in year t the firm has negative earnings, and in years t-1, t-2, and t+1 the firm reports positive
earnings, and 0 otherwise.
1 if STR equal 1, and loss in current year is less than or equal to 75% of prior two years, and NOLC
equal to 1.
1 if STR equal 1, and loss in current year is greater than 75% but less than or equal to 150% of prior
two years, and NOLC equal to 1
1 if NOLC equal 1. Firms report profit in the currrent three years. The currrent three years is the
current year and the two prior years (t-2, t-1, and t).
Natual logarithm of CEO cash compensation, excluding non-equity incentive, measured as
(SALARY +BONUS ).
Natual logarithm of CEO cash compensation, including non-equity incentive (e.g., performance pay),
measured as (SALARY +BONUS +NONEQ_INCENT ).
Research and development expense, measured as (XRD ) divided by net sales (SALE ); when missing,
reset to 0.
The leverage ratio, measured as (DLTT ) divided by total assets (AT ).
The ratio of intangible assets (INTAN ) to total assets (AT ).
1 if a firm has a non-missing, non-zero value for pre-tax income from foreign operations (PIFO ), and 0
otherwise.
CEO tenure in years.
Natual logarithm of total assets (AT ).
Advertising expense, measured as (XAD ) divided by net sales (SALE ); when missing, reset to 0;
Firms growth, measured as total assets (AT ) / (LT + (PRCC_F *CSHO )).
Size-adjusted return calculated as the buy and hold return of the security less the buy and hold return of
a size matched portfolio. Return accumulation begins in the fourth month of the second year after the
fiscal year end of t.

Compustat definitions are italicized and in parentheses.
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APPENDIX B
CALCULATING NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYBACK CAPACITY (NOLC)

I follow Erickson et al. (2013) to estimate net operating loss carry back capacity (NOLC),
which is the firm’s opportunity (i.e., capacity) to carry back operating losses. Tax loss carryback
capacity is an estimate of the unrefunded tax payments in the earliest carryback year that will
expire if the firm does not claim a refund in year t.
Firms can carry back net operating losses (NOLs) up to two years and carry forward
NOLs up to 20 years:
t-3

t-2

t-1

TI t-3

TI t-2

TI t-1

t

TI t

In order to ensure that the firm can carry back losses incurred in year t against income in
the earliest carryback year (t-2), I define taxable income (TI) as current tax expense divided by
the top statutory tax rate, which is 35%. The following is a function to calculate the potential
value of NOLC:
NOLC = MAX {0, TI t-2 + MIN [0, TI t-1 + MAX (0, TI t-3)]}.
Through the above function, I estimate the maximum amount of loss in year t that can be carried
back to obtain a refund of t-2 taxes.
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